NSC BRIEFING

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21 May 1958


LEBANON AND JORDAN

Lebanon

- I. Security situation:
 - Beirut appears quiet except for occasional bombings to keep shops closed, thus lend appearance to "general strike."
 - 1. There have been threats in last few days to turn violence against Americans - this sort of thing absent since attacks

on USIS 12 days ago. There is a stalemate.

- Tripoli-Army attempting mopping up operations.
- East ad-Din-Govt forces retreating from Druge led by Kamil Jumblett and ex-dyrian worlf util Shaqaya-
- Elsewhere-Border with Syria open infiltrators and arms flowing freely.
- 1. Government may again lose control northeastern region as result new larger-scale Syrian efforts there on 19 May. 2. Baalbek captured by apposition tribes men an al May. Political situation: II.
 - Lines hardening between opposition-especially Moslem leaders and Resolved Karame Yafi and Salb Salaam, -md government.
 - Moderate "Third Force." chief leaders being Edde brothers and Reuri Pharaon, attempted to bring about compromise including Shihab as prime minister and Chamoun finishing out term, but not seeking reelection. Characoun
- Chances has refused compromise but pressure on him is increasing List be hors from ou
- III. Outside intervention;
 - A. UAR infiltrators and arms from Syria freely cross border.



- USSR maintains Lebanon another case US Interference.
 - Soviet position has hardened in direct relation to 1. revelation of US plans to act at Lebanon's request.
 - However. Soviet threats still relatively weak.

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- Improbable that Moscow will act militarily. B.
 - 1. Politically Moscow inhibited because Chamoun and cabinet are legal government.
 - 2. There is no "wronged party" on Soviet side to bring its case to the UN.
 - (a) Radio prosecut desorting greatest altertum to believe evel.
 - Moscow risks exposing itself to charge of interference in Lebanese affairs should it act on behalf of UAR.
 - Monetheless. Moscow will benefit either way on intervention.
 - If intervention then full exploitation of presence (a) of western troops.
 - If no intervention Moscow can claim its threats were <u>deterrest against western aggession.</u> Approved For Release 2003/09/02: CIA-RDP79R00890A00100d010020-3

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- V. Key to continuing trouble is hold by VAR.
 - A. Chamoun and security forces could control situation if left alone, but Masir can prolong violence indefinitely by keeping up supplies of arms and infiltrators.

Jordan

VI. Amman authorities appear to be alert to new UAR-supported instability in Jordan.

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- VII. Meanwhile, Iraqi-Jordaniau Arab Union cabinet formed on 17 May appears to reflect disinclination of both nations to develop effective union government.
 - A. Jordanian strongman Samir Rifai was not placed in union cabinet, allegedly because of Jordan's dissatisfaction with Iraq's coolness toward Union and because he needed in Amman for upcoming security problem.
 - B. This development will reduce ability of pro-Western Arab states to develop effective basis for withstanding Masir's bid for domination of Arab world.

VIII. Sudanese leaders at few that if Nasis succession wine in Lebanon, who sudan will be next on his list.

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